图书介绍
激励理论PDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本网盘下载
- （美）拉奉特（JEAN-JACQUESLAFFONT），DAVIDMARTIMORT著 著
- 出版社： 北京;西安：世界图书出版公司
- ISBN：9787510050503
- 出版时间：2013
- 标注页数：421页
- 文件大小：52MB
- 文件页数：434页
- 主题词：激励理论－英文
PDF下载
下载说明
激励理论PDF格式电子书版下载
下载的文件为RAR压缩包。需要使用解压软件进行解压得到PDF格式图书。建议使用BT下载工具Free Download Manager进行下载,简称FDM(免费,没有广告,支持多平台）。本站资源全部打包为BT种子。所以需要使用专业的BT下载软件进行下载。如BitComet qBittorrent uTorrent等BT下载工具。迅雷目前由于本站不是热门资源。不推荐使用！后期资源热门了。安装了迅雷也可以迅雷进行下载！
（文件页数 要大于 标注页数，上中下等多册电子书除外）
注意：本站所有压缩包均有解压码： 点击下载压缩包解压工具
图书目录
Introduction1
1 Incentives in Economic Thought7
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture8
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management11
1.3 Hume,Wicksell,Groves：The Free-Rider Problem14
1.4 Borda,Bowen,Vickrey：Incentives in Voting15
1.5 Léon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies18
1.6 Knight,Arrow,Pauly：Incentives in Insurance18
1.7 Sidgwick,Vickrey,Mirrlees：Redistribution and Incentives20
1.8 Dupuit,Edgeworth,Pigou：Price Discrimination22
1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies23
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design25
1.11 Auctions27
2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off28
2.1 The Basic Model32
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract33
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts36
2.4 Information Rents39
2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal40
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off41
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information46
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing48
2.9 The Revelation Principle48
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent51
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints57
2.12 Commitment63
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms65
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting68
2.15 Contract Theory at Work72
Appendix81
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection82
3.1 More than Two Types86
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information93
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives101
3.4 Random Participation Constraint115
3.5 Limited Liability118
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification121
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off130
Appendices134
4 Moral Hazard：The Basic Trade-Offs145
4.1 The Model148
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation153
4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency155
4.4 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency158
4.5 More than Two Levels of Pefformance163
4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting167
4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm172
4.8 Contract Theory at Work174
4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard184
Appendices185
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard187
5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort191
5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem203
5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function226
5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard232
Appendices235
6 Nonverifiability240
6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining242
6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract244
6.3 Nash Implementation246
6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation256
6.5 Risk Aversion261
6.6 Concluding Remarks264
7 Mixed Models265
7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard269
7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection294
7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability298
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment303
8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection307
8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard319
8.3 Constraints on Transfers：The Role of Implicit Incentives342
9 Limits and Extensions347
9.1 Informed Principal351
9.2 Limits to Enforcement360
9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment364
9.4 The Hold-Up Problem370
9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts375
9.6 Limits in the Action Space387
9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior391
9.8 Endogenous Information Structures395
References399
Author Index413
Subject Index417