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Chapter 1 History of the Global Financial System1

1.1 History1

1.2 The Bretton Woods System5

1.2.1 Pressures on the Bretton Woods System7

1.2.2 Collapse of the Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System9

1.2.3 The International Monetary Fund Today11

1.2.4 The World Bank13

1.2.5 The World Trade Organization13

1.3 The System Today14

Chapter 2 Globalization and Global Capital Flows15

Chapter 3 The Latin American and African Debt Crisis of 198221

3.1 The Debt Crisis of 198221

3.2 The Loans of the 1970s： Their Origins and Destinations23

3.2.1 The Lenders24

3.2.2 The Borrowers25

3.3 Causes of the Latin American and African Debt Crisis25

3.3.1 Recycling of OPEC Funds26

3.3.2 Bank Behaviour27

3.3.2.1 Time and Ignorance of History28

3.3.2.2 Inexperience of the Banks29

3.3.2.3 Bank Profitability and Market Share30

3.3.2.4 The Promotion of Bankers’ Careers31

3.3.2.5 Strong Debtor Economies31

3.3.2.6 Syndicated Lending32

3.3.2.7 Floating Interest Rates32

3.3.2.8 The Position of US Banks at Home32

3.3.3 Debtor Nation Policies33

3.3.3.1 Large Budget Deficits33

3.3.3.2 Overvalued Exchange Rates33

3.3.3.3 Anti-export Trade Regimes33

3.3.3.4 Capital Flight34

3.3.3.5 Corruption34

3.3.4 External Factors35

3.3.4.1 Interest Rate Increases35

3.3.4.2 Adverse Exchange Rate Movements35

3.3.4.3 Falls in Commodity Prices36

3.3.4.4 The Worldwide Recession36

3.3.4.5 Cessation of Petrodollar Recycling36

3.3.4.6 Conclusion on External Factors36

Chapter 4 The Brady Plan39

4.1 Background to the Brady Plan39

4.2 The Baker Plan40

4.3 The Brady Plan40

4.3.1 Mexico’s Brady Restructuring41

4.3.2 The Phillipines Brady Restructuring47

4.3.3 Venezuela’s Brady Restructuring48

4.3.4 Uruguay’s and Chile’s Restructurings50

4.3.5 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring Initiated50

4.3.6 Argentina’s Brady Restructuring50

4.3.7 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring is Completed51

4.3.8 Collateralizing Brady Bonds52

4.3.9 Conclusions Regarding the Brady Plan53

Chapter 5 The Asian Economic Crisis of 199755

5.1 The Crisis Erupts55

5.2 Causes of the Asian Economic Crisis56

5.2.1 Type of Indebtedness57

5.2.2 Extent of Indebtedness57

5.2.2.1 Excess Liquidity in the Developed World58

5.2.2.2 The Central Role of Crossover Investors59

5.2.3 Financial Sector Weaknesses60

5.2.3.1 Failure to Intermediate Capital Flows Effectively60

5.2.3.2 The Premature Liberalization of Local Financial Markets61

5.2.4 Fixed Exchange Rates61

5.2.5 Region-Wide Loss of Confidence62

5.3 Conclusion and Lessons63

5.3.1 The Bene§its of Floating Exchange Rates64

5.3.2 The High Risks of Foreign Currency Borrowing64

5.3.3 The Need for Long-Term Local Currency Capital65

5.3.4 International Capital Flows as a Product of Developed World Liquidity65

5.3.5 The Urgent Need for a New Perspective on Responsibility in International Lending and Investment65

5.4 The Role and Impact of the IMF in the Asian Crisis66

5.4.1 Misdiagnosis67

5.4.2 Excessive Conditionality68

5.4.3 Protection of the System and of Creditors69

5.4.4 Mishandling of Market Expectations70

5.4.5 Social Costs of IMF Policies70

5.5 Conclusions on the IMF’s Role in the Asian Crisis71

Chapter 6 Let’s all Cry for Argentina75

6.1 The Argentine Experience75

6.2 Causes of the Argentine Crisis77

6.2.1 The Peso-Dollar Peg77

6.2.2 Excessive Indebtedness78

6.2.3 Corruption79

6.2.4 IMF Policies80

6.3 The Restructuring of Argentina’s Indebtedness81

Chapter 7 Debt Relief for Poor Countries and for Iraq85

7.1 Debt Relief85

7.2 The US Approach to Iraqi Debt86

7.3 Debt-for-Development Exchanges93

Chapter 8 Measures Available to Debtor Nations97

8.1 Rigorous Local Prudential Regulation97

8.2 Debt Policy99

8.2.1 Borrow Less Foreign Currency Debt99

8.2.2 Issue Less Short-Term Debt100

8.2.3 Issue More Long-Term Local Currency Denominated Debt100

8.3 Exchange Rate Policies101

8.4 Capital Controls104

8.4.1 Chile’s Controls107

8.4.2 Malaysia’s Controls108

8.4.3 The Uses of Inflow Controls109

8.4.4 The Uses of Outflow Controls110

8.4.5 Inflow and Outflow Controls Compared111

8.4.6 Inflow Controls in Developed Countries111

8.4.7 Conclusion on Capital Controls112

8.5 Be More Willing to Play the Default Card112

Chapter 9 Global Measures to Improve the System121

9.1 The National Balance Sheet Problem121

9.1.1 The Volatility Machine122

9.1.2 Original Sin123

9.1.3 Currency Mismatches124

9.1.4 Local Currency Bond Markets125

9.1.5 An International Solution127

9.1.5.1 Changing the Lending Policies of Multilateral Development Banks129

9.1.5.2 Local Currency Solutions130

9.1.5.3 Re-orienting the Paris Club130

9.1.6 Conclusion on National Balance Sheet Structures131

9.2 A Tax on International Currency Transactions132

9.3 A Global Financial Regulator135

9.4 A Lender of Last Resort135

9.5 A Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime137

9.5.1 The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes138

9.5.2 Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime？139

9.5.2.1 Absence of an Overarching Need - until Relatively Recently - for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime140

9.5.2.2 Difficulties of Creating International Institutions140

9.5.2.3 Perceived Interests of Creditors141

9.5.3 The Details of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime142

9.6 Collective Action Clauses143

9.7 The IMF Proposal： The SDRM145

9.7.1 Would the SDRM Have Served the Debtors？148

9.8 Bene§its of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime151

9.8.1 Conclusion on Systemic Measures152

Chapter 10 The Way Forward155

10.1 The Socialization of Private Sector Debt156

10.2 The Future of the IMF158

10.2.1 The IMF and Poverty in Africa165

10.2.2 The Fund’s Inability to Reinvent Itself166

List of References171

Index191